Most past explanations of differential performance during discontinuities have placed the cause on (matched or mismatched) capabilities and (successful or failed) actions, omitting the role of managerial cognition. Despite an increasing emphasis on managerial cognition in business academia, there have been limited attempts to link top management mental models to strategic choice and action in the face of dynamic, discontinuous events. We argue that, in these eras of ferment, the case for managerial discretion is particularly strong. Analysis of 23 years of data on the response of major pharmaceutical companies to the biotechnology revolution shows that top management recognition of this new technology can help explain organizational outcomes, controlling for a host of alternative explanations.
I. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Schumpeter (1934 Schumpeter ( , 1942 , students of technical and industrial change have sought to understand the effects of technological discontinuities on industries and organizations. There is general agreement that discontinuities create problems for established firms (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994) , but there is no consensus as to why discontinuities should be so difficult to manage.
At one extreme, conventional neoclassical economics has argued that firms respond rationally in response to discontinuous shifts in demand or supply: established firm "failure" to invest in new technologies is interpreted as a function of differential incentives to invest in new technologies (Gans & Stern, 2000; Gilbert & Newbery, 1982; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Reinganum, 1983) . At the other extreme, population ecologists have argued that powerful inertial forces such as the need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders make significant organizational change extraordinarily hard (Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Hannan & Freeman, 1984) .
Between these two extremes, scholars in the tradition of Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson and Clark (1990) have focused on the role of organizational capabilities in shaping established firm response, while Christensen and his collaborators (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Bower, 1996) have suggested that discontinuities create problems because they challenge the existing business models and "value maps" of established companies. Both streams draw on a research tradition that dates back to Cyert and March (1963) and Simon (1947) : a tradition that stresses that organizations are constrained by their existing mental models and patterns of problem solving to search only "locally" for plausible solutions (Levinthal, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982) . These streams tend to stress the distributed nature of organizational response: the presence of old "frames" 1 throughout the organization.
An alternative tradition focuses on the role of senior management in shaping organizational response to radical change. The idea that senior managers play an important role in setting strategy has, of course, a long and distinguished pedigree, dating back (at least!) to Andrews (1971) and Selznick (1957) . Tushman and his collaborators, for example, have suggested that those firms that do manage to navigate major discontinuities have more variance in team tenure and background or tend to replace their senior management teams at critical moments, suggesting that senior management teams play an important role in shaping firm response (Murmann & Tushman, 1997; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996) . Romanelli and Tushman (1986) show that top teams exert influence differentially over the different stages of the technical trajectory and have the most impact in the era of ferment or during a discontinuity, while Virany and Tushman (1986) show that shakeouts that remove the entire top team are often the most effective for helping the organization to adapt to a new environment.
More recent work has focused on the intriguing question of whether the mental models of senior management are responsible for the difficulties many firms face in responding effectively to discontinuities. Mental models have two characteristics that are particularly relevant in the face of discontinuity: (1) they filter the perceptions about what is happening and what action should be taken (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) , and, (2) they are mostly hidden or implicit -most people are not aware that they have them or that they affect their decision-making (Westrum, 1982) . Researchers have begun to make the empirical case for the importance and role of mental models during eras of ferment, showing that cognitive maps change in response to environmental discontinuities (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992) or that controlled (rather than automatic)
processing is critical during periods of turbulence (Reger & Palmer, 1996) .
However empirical work exploring the role of senior managerial recognition in shaping established firms' responses to technological discontinuities is still at a preliminary stage.
Burgelman, in a stream of papers about Intel, has suggested that Intel was able to manage a major discontinuity in its business, despite the fact that senior management failed to recognize a number of major shifts in the firm's environment, because the senior management team did not interfere with autonomous decisions generated at the local level (Burgelman, 1991 (Burgelman, , 1994 . More recently, Burgelman has suggested that Intel's recent success can be attributed to Andy Grove's superior strategic vision (Burgelman, 2001) . Similarly, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) show that management has significant discretion in what they term "high velocity environments" and in more recent work, Brown and Eisenhardt claim that successful firms manage discontinuities by sustaining a strategy making process that is "at the edge of chaos" (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998 ). In such "weak situations" (Mischel, 1968) where the characteristics are not clear enough to dictate action, the executive's mental model of the environment, not the "objective" characteristics of the situation become the basis strategic choice (Finkelstein et al., 1988) . Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) , in their inductive case study of Polaroid, suggest that this firm's apparently paradoxical response to the transition from analog to digital imaging technologies -early technical leadership but failure to be competitive in the digital camera market -can be explained by management belief structures that placed primacy on technical excellence and modeled economic success on a razor/razor blade model that was ultimately inappropriate in the digital world.
These studies suggest that the nature of the discontinuity can only be known in retrospect (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) . The specific nature of the discontinuity, the dimensions along which it will have impact, and the appropriate path of action are not necessarily obvious in the moment. Vincenti (1994) showed that the retractable landing gear for airplanes was not immediately recognized as discontinuity nor a potential dominant design relative to "pants"-type fixed landing gear by many in the industry. And, Rosenbloom and Cusumano's (1987) portrayal of the Beta-VHS video tape battle made it clear that, while most saw that video tape was important, the real nature of the discontinuity and the specific dimensions of merit were not apparent until later. All of these "known" factors ex post are no longer known ex ante. Thus, players first need to "make sense" (Weick, 1995) of their situation in the era of ferment -the opportunity to create a discontinuity, the realization that one might be occurring, a picture of what direction(s) the discontinuity might head -before they can act.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the pharmaceutical industry and on its response to biotechnology. Several quantitative studies have explored the ways in which the major pharmaceutical firms have responded to major changes in their technological base. Gambardella (1992) and Henderson and Cockburn (1994) suggested that the those firms who were closest to science adopted the techniques of "rational" drug discovery most effectively, while Zucker and Darby (1996) found that the firms that adopted biotechnology were significantly larger than their competitors. Here we extend these results by incorporating measures of senior management recognition in an analysis of the determinants of firms' response.
We present an analysis of 23 years of data on the response of 15 major US and UK pharmaceutical companies to the biotechnology revolution. Biotechnology provides a rich and complex context in which to explore these issues, since the emergence of biotechnology was not a single, well understood event but rather a complex mix of scientific, technical and business model changes that unfolded over several distinct phases (Murray & Kaplan, 2001 ).
In the absence of a precise structural model of the underlying phenomena, we seek simply to show systematic relationships between our key variables once important controls are put in place. The analysis proceeds through an estimation and interpretation of a diffusion equation, Y j,t = (X j,ˆt , Z j,ˆt , ε) where Y j,t , the dependent variable, is a measure of the extent to which firm j has responded to the discontinuity in time t. The main explanatory variable X j,ˆt is a measure of the importance that the top management of a particular firm places on biotechnology in some previous year and Z j,ˆt is a vector of control variables, also lagged.
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Using a measure of senior management recognition derived from each firm's Letter to Shareholders in its Annual Report and a number of measures of strategic response, including gene sequence patents, general biotechnology patents, papers and equity based alliances, we
show that top management recognition of biotechnology is systematically associated with strategic action (even when controlling for firm and year fixed effects, previous activity and a number of other alternative explanations). While our results raise a number of important unanswered questions, they are consistent with the belief that senior management's "sensemaking" -their recognition and interpretation of the environment -may be an additional explanatory factor in understanding firm fate and performance during periods of technological discontinuity.
2 Notice that our approach differs significantly from much of the existing work in managerial cognition. Researchers in managerial cognition typically study a small number of firms: single or paired studies are the most common, e.g., Huff and Schwenk's (1990) case studies of Chrysler and an oil company or Barr, Stimpert and Huff's (1992) examination of two railroad companies over a long period of environmental change. Those that use a cross sectional design -e.g. , Thomas, Clark and Gioia's (1993) path analyses on 156 hospitals or Porac et al.'s evaluation of the Scottish knitwear industry (Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995) -generally focus on relatively stable settings where it is difficult to examine issues of strategic change or at a minimum have not examined a changing environment over time. Up until recently, only a few "small n" studies have examined the link between top management perceptions of the environment and performance, e.g., (Bourgeois, 1985) . Some current studies are moving to capture larger samples of firms and make a statistical connection between cognition and firm performance, taking into account the degree of market change. Sutcliffe and Weber (2000) examine the link between the accuracy of management's perception of the stability of the market and firm performance across 86 firms in multiple industries with various degrees of instability. Houghton, Stewart and Barr (2000) examine 63 hospitals and suggest that top management team absorptive capacity is directly connected with superior capacity utilization in a period of market upheaval.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section II with a brief review of the pharmaceutical industry's response to biotechnology, in order to demonstrate that senior managerial recognition of its importance might plausibly have a very significant effect on firm response. In Section III, we then turn to a discussion of our sample construction, of our measures of senior management recognition, firm response, and our control variables. Section IV presents our results and Section V concludes.
II. Biotechnology as a major discontinuity
The emergence of biotechnology was an important scientific, technological and business discontinuity for the pharmaceutical industry (Henderson, Orsenigo, & Pisano, 1999) and represents an ideal opportunity to explore managerial recognition and response. Biotechnology led a significant number of firms to change their technological identity (Zucker & Darby, 1997) , fostered the entry of over 1,000 new firms in a twenty-five year period, and created new products, processes and modes of research and development. In this section, we briefly review the critical events and trends in the history of biotechnology in order to demonstrate that ex ante the implications of biotechnology were not immediately obvious, and that it is plausible that senior managerial interpretations of the role of biotechnology might have a significant effect on the ways in which their firms responded to it.
The elucidation of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953 ushered in a period of rapid scientific change. Although it was greeted with considerable fanfare in the scientific community, the commercial implications of the discovery were not immediately evident. As
Watson noted in a recent interview "of course I didn't think of patenting the structure of DNA, although it was scientifically exciting it did not seem to be in the least bit relevant" (interview on National Public Radio). The structure of DNA provided the foundations of a new scientific agenda but the discovery that ultimately led to commercial applications came with the establishment by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer in 1973 of "cut and paste" techniques for DNA fragments (cloning genetically engineered molecules in foreign cells) (Cohen, Chang, Boyer, & Helling, 1973) . In hindsight, this breakthrough, which was followed closely by the first generation of monoclonal antibodies in 1975 (Kohler & Milstein, 1975) , is widely viewed as the moment of the technical discontinuity that created the potential for the biotechnology industry. At the time, the fact that this was a discontinuity was apparent only to a few in the industry, and even for them there was very little clarity about how the technology might ultimately evolve.
By any measure the pharmaceutical industry was well established by the 1970's. Large scale R&D was a substantial barrier to entry, while high profits were supported by the long-term protection of patents and by substantial investments in regulatory, sales and marketing assets and expertise. However, despite the productivity of the post war period, as the pharmaceutical firms entered the 1970's they were increasingly concerned with their ability to maintain innovative output and its consequent high profitability (Comanor, 1986 ).
Biotechnology was not immediately regarded as a potential solution to this problem.
There was widespread fear that this line of research would lead to the development of bacteria containing cancer-causing genes that might spread to the human population, and there was also concern that discoveries in biotechnology might not be readily appropriable (it was not clear if patents in this area would be either possible or enforceable). Eli Lilly was early to embrace biotechnology, in part because there was a possibility that the first breakthroughs would be in artificial insulin, a product that would immediately threaten the Lilly franchise in insulin products, but its competitors, by and large, held back, and focused their energy instead on the adoption of the techniques of "rational" or "science driven" drug discovery (Henderson et al., 1999) . Scientific publications and patents in the biotechnology field, relatively rare in the early 1980's, took off and were appearing at a rate of more than 4,000 patents and 9,300 publications per year in the overall industry by 1986.
By the late 1980's, the technologies and products of biotechnology were well established among biotechnology companies and a small number of the pharmaceutical firms, but there was considerable debate about whether biotechnology was best thought of as a source of specific protein products ("large molecule" drugs) or whether biotechnology was best thought of as a research tool. By 1990, fourteen new biotechnology products had been released (counted by NCE rather than therapeutic indication) to treat diseases ranging from hemophilia to leukemia to cystic fibrosis, but in a parallel effort, several new biotechnology firms, including Vertex in Cambridge, Massachusetts were founded not to produce proteins but to produce small molecule These competing interpretations of the "true role" of biotechnology have still not been entirely resolved, and there continues to be lively debate about the future of the technology.
However most pharmaceutical companies have by now recognized the crucial role of the entire range of tools and techniques that are encompassed by genetic engineering and genomics.
Biotechnology patenting and publications has risen to an approximately 20% share of most pharmaceutical company portfolios, financing routes for new entrants are well established, and biotechnology itself is undergoing consolidation and a flurry of acquisitions activity.
III. Sample and variable construction
Our central hypothesis is that pharmaceutical firm biotechnology-related actions were an increasing function of the importance that top management teams attributed to biotechnology. In this section we describe the construction of our sample, of our dependent and independent variables, and of our controls.
Sample construction
Our study focuses on the evolution of top 15 US and UK pharmaceutical companies between 1973 and 1998, where the "top" firms were defined by their pharmaceutical sales ranking in 1973, based on a ranking from James' (1977) study of multinational pharmaceutical firms. We begin our analysis in 1973 since it is the year of publication of the Cohen and Boyer publication, a year widely acknowledged as marking the "beginning" of the biotechnology industry. We chose to focus our analysis on the largest pharmaceutical firms since it is the reactions of established incumbents we are most interested in exploring. In addition, these pharmaceutical firms have a broadly similar set of capabilities (large international firms with research-intensive pharmaceutical businesses) and therefore give us the opportunity to explore recognition as separate from resources.
The fifteen companies are listed in Table 1 . We eliminated any companies from an initial list of the top 20 whose pharmaceutical sales were less than one-third of their total sales (thus, companies.
Measures of Recognition
Our major empirical challenge was to construct reasonable quantitative measures of top management mental models that can be entered into regression models. To date this has been accomplished primarily using demographic measures as proxies (e.g., Virany and Tushman 1986; Norburn and Birley 1988; Ancona and Nadler 1989; Wiersema and Bantel 1992) , though in a recent cross sectional analysis survey data of management impressions of industry change were used (Houghton et al., 2000) .
Here we use normalized word counts derived from the Letters to Shareholders (or Chairman's Letters) from the Annual Reports of each of sample company as our primary measure of recognition. Annual Reports in general, and the Letters to Shareholders in particular, have been used in a number of studies of managerial cognition and offer a number of advantages.
3 Because they are documents produced ex ante (in the specific time period that they represent), their use avoids the problem of retrospective bias, and they are directly comparable across firms and over time. Other potential sources such as press releases or speeches, in contrast, are not consistently available across the sample, and internal sources such as minutes from Board meetings are extremely difficult to obtain.
Moreover substantial qualitative evidence suggests that the Letter is written or closely reviewed by the Chairman and/or CEO, that it is distributed to the executive team for comments and revisions. In addition, for fiduciary reasons, it is unlikely that a company would suppress discussions of important issues in the Letter to Shareholders, even if they did not reflect entirely favorably on the company (Freeman, 1998 ). Fiol's (1995) study comparing internal (strategic planning documents) and external (annual reports) views in the forest products industry showed that while judgments about the specific nature of an issue (threat or opportunity) were not significantly related in the two kinds of documents, the basic thematic emphases (in this case, regarding control) were the same. We believe that they can therefore be reasonably taken as top management's interpretation about what is important for the company's performance and future prospects.
We use a normalized count of "biotechnology words" in the Letters to Shareholders as our primary measure of recognition 4 . We define biotechnology words as the set of commonly used expressions that are synonymous with or a subset of biotechnology 5 . In our sample, the total number of biotechnology associated words in any year ranges from 0 to 13 with an average of a little over one per year. The raw count is normalized by the number of paragraphs in the Letter to Shareholders to allow comparison across years and across companies. The normalization is important since the number of paragraphs in the Letters to Shareholders varies from 4 to 87 with an average of 26. In our analyses, we examine both "stock" (accumulated number of mentions in the Letter to Shareholders discounted by 20 percent) and "flow"
(mentions in a particular year) measures of recognition.
Measures of strategic response
One might imagine that counts of biotech drugs launched might be the most direct measure of biotech strategic action, and indeed, as Figure 1 suggests, there is over the sample a general relationship between senior management recognition as measured by normalized word count and the number of biotechnology drugs introduced by the 15 firms.
Unfortunately using drug counts as a primary measure of strategic action introduces a number of problems. In the first place, since it takes a very long time to develop a new drug, there is typically a very significant lag between the decision to invest in biotechnology and the introduction of a new drug. In the second place, since there were only 35 drugs launched by all of the 15 companies over the entire period we studied, drug counts is likely to be a particularly noisy measure of strategic action.
To explore the link between managerial recognition and organizational response, we thus focus instead on four different measures of action: gene sequence patents, biotechnology-related patents, scientific publications and alliances.
Patents are a well-established measure of innovative output among pharmaceutical firms, since patent protection is a critical source of economic rents in this industry and are thus widely used to measure research productivity and capability building (Henderson et al., 1999; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000) . We first use a simple count of gene sequence patents assigned to any one of the 15 companies in the sample, a measure also used by Zucker and Darby (1996) in assessing pharmaceutical firm transformation of the technical identity in the face of the biotechnology revolution (Zucker et al., 1996) . While they used data from GenBank, our source for genetic sequence patents is Derwent Inc.'s GENESEQ database. This data is only available from 1980, so we use a shorter panel to test the association of recognition with this measure of action.
Because gene sequence patents are a relatively narrow measure of firm activity in the biotechnology arena, we also use a count of all biotechnology related patents. We include any biotechnology patent covering genetic engineering and fermentation, biochemical engineering, sensors and analysis, biotechnology-based pharmaceuticals, cell cultures, biocatalysis and downstream processing. All patents for a firm and for any majority owned subsidiaries are included (e.g., we include any patents filed by Immunex during 1994-1998, the period in which they were majority owned by American Home Products). Our source for patent data is Derwent Inc.'s World Patent Index (for 1973-1981) and Biotechnology Abstracts (for 1982-1998) databases.
Our third measure is a count of biotechnology-oriented publications. Publication counts are an important indicator of the thrust of research activity. Pharmaceutical companies tend to publish at rates equivalent to research institutes and universities (Hicks, 1995; Koenig, 1983) , and publication counts have been previously construed as representing the level of investment in basic science (Gambardella, 1995) 6 . We included the same technical categories of publications as for patents. As a fourth measure of biotechnology-related strategic action, we count the number of biotechnology equity deals between our pharmaceutical companies and the biotechnology startups. This is a less typically used but equally interesting measure of strategic action in that alliances are usually reviewed on a case-by-case basis directly by the top management team.
Alliance data are drawn from a database maintained by Recombinant Capital (ReCap),
Windhover's Pharmaceutical Strategic Alliances (Volumes I-X), and an additional search of related industry literature. Table 2 about here ----------------------------------- Table 2 provides summary statistics and correlation coefficients for these four measures of strategic action. Table 3 gives their values over time. Patents and publications have their first major growth period in the early 1980's, while alliances only pick up at the end of the decade.
All activity seems to lull in the early 1990's; and, while patenting and alliances pick up again later, scientific publications continue their decline. In addition, the coefficient of variation generally gets smaller over time indicating that there has been some type of convergence in the industry. In our analysis, we therefore include year fixed effects rather than a time variable because while the changes in the dependent and independent variables are generally increasing over time, this is not smooth on a year-by-year basis. 7 We experimented with a measure of deals defined as any deal done between a pharmaceutical firm and a new biotechnology firm, including licensing, R&D, production and distribution deals. The results were unchanged, and we report the measure described above because we believe that the underlying data on which it is based are significantly more reliable than the alternative measure. Table 3 about here
Controls
Firm and year dummies. We include firm fixed effects in most of the regressions to control for the fact that firms may have heterogeneous competencies that shape their response to biotechnology. Year dummies are included to control for the fact that the cost of responding to biotechnology almost certainly fell dramatically over the time covered by our data.
Economies of scale.
Total firm sales and total R&D spending are included to control for potential economies of scale in the adoption of new techniques. Zucker and Darby (1996; found evidence for their importance in the case of biotechnology. And Cockburn, Henderson and Stern (2000) note that, in strategic theories of the firm, scale is important in that it provides the resources to adopt new approaches that drive performance. While ideally one would measure scale as a function of pharmaceutical sales and R&D, these data are typically not reported for the entire period (for sales) or at all (for R&D). However, since we selected only firms with a high percent of sales in pharmaceuticals, this may not be a dramatic distortion.
Financial performance. We include firm operating income as a percent of sales to measure the extent of financial well-being. The literature provides ambiguous predictions as to the effect of this variable. On the one hand, higher returns could represent the availability of firm-wide resources for investment in a new technological field; on the other hand, it could be that firms with higher returns might be more complacent (or said differently, firms with lower returns would be more risk seeking) with regard to the adoption of new techniques (Bowman, 1982; Kahneman, 1994) . Again, as with firm sales, this measure is clouded by the fact that it represents all firm profits and sales and not just those associated with the pharmaceutical business.
Competitive actions. An institutional argument would suggest that strategic response might be driven by some form of isomorphism in which firms respond to the actions of the other members of their competitive set (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) . To control for this possibility we include competitive actions measured as the sum of patents, publications or deals for all the other firms in the sample in that year.
Science orientation. Given the scientific complexity of biotechnology and the fact that its adoption may be driven by the degree to which a firm is scientifically oriented (Henderson et al., 1999) , we have included a measure that captures the propensity towards science. We use a measure of the degree to which the firm has adopted incentives that favor publishing by in-house scientists: the fraction of individuals whose names appear on a patent who also appear as an author on papers published within two years of the patent application (PUBFRAC). This measure is an indicator of the degree to which those scientists that are involved in the drug discovery process (as represented by patenting) are also able to participate in the broader scientific discourse (through publications). For a more detailed discussion of the nature and construction of this variable, see (Cockburn et al., 2000) . This too is measured in 1981 and entered as an initial condition in the restricted dataset. Table 4 summarizes the mean and standard deviation for each of our controls.
Knowledge capital (knowledge-based resources). Resource-based views of the firm
argue that firm resources (including knowledge resources) create absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and give the firm greater ability to generate productive output in those areas (Barney, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984) . We examined the share of firm patents devoted to therapeutic areas that were most closely associated with "science driven drug discovery" (cardiology and oncology) as one measure of the scientific understanding accumulated in the firm. We hypothesized that firms that have a higher proportion of their research output in fields that require higher degrees of science might be more receptive to biotechnology.
Market position.
Classical strategy theory is premised on the idea that a firm's position in the market will affect its strategic choices. While the economic literature provides mixed findings in this area, Cockburn, Henderson and Stern (2001) present some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms with a high market share (and thus some sort of monopoly power) should be more likely to adopt new techniques because they will have the most to gain. Here, again, we use market share measures for the cardiology and oncology fields.
Balance of power within the firm. It may also be the case that the balance of power within a firm may affect the adoption of new techniques. If sales are dominated by these same science-oriented fields, decision-making may naturally favor new techniques that also have a substantial scientific component. We use measures of within firm share of sales in cardiology and oncology to control for this hypothesis
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 4 
about here -----------------------------------

IV. Results
Qualitative evidence and descriptive statistics
There is very substantial variation across firms in both the degree to which senior management recognizes the advent of biotechnology and in the timing and extent of subsequent to Stockholders, 1985) . By 1986, the BMS top team indicated that biotechnology and genetic engineering specifically were the "the biomedical advances that are expected to dominate drug discover and therapy by the early part of the century" (BMS, Letter to Stockholders, 1986) . This emphasis by top management on the importance of biotechnology was followed by a period of rapid growth in patenting and publications. Their commitment grew steadily through the 1990's, manifesting itself in intensified investment in biotechnology, in particular in searching for technologies on the outside: "Our new department of External Science and Technology will focus on future alliances and early-stage science (in biotechnology). We added to our facilities in Syracuse to begin to make these biotechnology products…And we dedicated a new Center for the Study of Genetics and Cellular and Molecular Biology in Strasbourg, France. The center is part of the company's ongoing commitment to fund long-term research in molecular genetics…" (BMS, Letter to Stockholders, 1994) . This was followed by an uptick in their alliance activity in the late 1990's.
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here -----------------------------------
Eli Lilly was quicker to jump on the biotechnology opportunity ( Figure 3) . As early as 1977, they devoted a whole section of the Annual Report to biotechnology, saying "Nothing, perhaps, symbolizes the life science revolution more dramatically than research with recombinant DNA…" (Eli Lilly, Annual Report, 1977) . In 1978, the CEO indicated that "significant attention is being given to newer research programs in the immunological mechanism of the body, recombinant DNA, how plants convert sunlight to chemical energy, and many other fundamental studies" (Eli Lilly, Letter to Shareholders, 1978) . The first thrust was biosynthetic human insulin, pursued aggressively to protect their diabetes franchise, but this quickly grew to a broad focus on biomedical research. This early emphasis by top management was followed by rapid growth in patenting and publications in biotechnology. By the mid 1980's, they were focused as much on improving research approaches for traditional small molecules as on synthesizing large molecules such as insulin. "Lilly is applying recombinant DNA technology to many areas of research. Molecular biologists are using this scientific tool to study genes, receptors, and enzymes. Their discoveries may speed up efforts to develop new chemical agents in several therapeutic categories. In addition, company scientists are using this biotechnology to develop natural proteins, such as activated protein C, and to modify natural proteins, such as tissue plasminogen activator" (Eli Lilly, Letter to Shareholders, 1987) . By the mid 1990's, they had fully integrated biotechnology into their pharmaceutical effort: "A … critical capability is biotechnology, a distinct Lilly strength. We are among the world's largest and most experienced biotech companies -with proven abilities to discover, develop, and manufacture both small organic molecules and large natural molecules" (Eli Lilly, Letter to Shareholders, 1994).
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 3 about here -----------------------------------
Not all of the companies in the sample followed this pattern. These "outliers" demonstrate the heterogeneity of firm recognition and response and highlight the difficulties inherent in obtaining appropriate measures of both concepts. For example, as shown in Figure 4 , Merck referred very little to biotechnology in their Annual Reports (though focused heavily on broader scientific issues) but published and patented in the area quite aggressively. Their Letters to Stockholders contain many references to their "remarkably strong research organization" (1976) , "the important contributions our research makes to science and health " (1979) , and its "superior technological innovation in biology, chemistry, and engineering" (1985) . Their strategy was to utilize "high technology in every aspect of research -from biotechnology and basic research, to increasing speed in clinical development, gaining faster regulatory approvals, and demonstrating health outcomes" (1992). Because Merck was (and is) a highly scienceoriented firm, they appear to have interpreted biotechnology not as a major discontinuity but rather as the emergence of a new technique for improving the search process for small molecules. Thus, our measure of recognition, which focuses on use of biotechnology-specific words, only captures the extent to which a firm saw biotechnology as a separate technology, distinct from its regular activities.
Quantitative Results
Despite this heterogeneity across our sample and the potential flaws in our measures, we find systematic patterns of association between recognition and response to biotechnology in more formal analyses. In this section, we discuss the results from three sets of regressions. Table   5 explores the degree to which senior management "recognition" is a distinct construct by exploring the degree to which it is predicted by strategic action. Tables 6-9 examine the effect of top management recognition of biotechnology on each of our measures of strategic action in turn 8 .
In an initial test of the relationship between our measures of recognition and action, we examine the hypothesis that previous actions might predict top management assessment of the importance of biotechnology. Table 5 regresses our measure of "recognition" against each of our major measures of "action" with firm and year fixed effects. There is no significant association between gene sequences, patenting, publications or deals and subsequent mentions of biotechnology in the Letter to Shareholders, suggesting that management recognition is not determined by the firm's prior experience. Table 5 about here Tables 6-9 , we present our core result: strategic actions (defined as the number of biotech patents, gene sequences, publications or equity deals) as a function of the stock of weighted biotechnology related words. Overall, the results are very robust when strategic action is defined in terms of patents and gene sequences, marginal when defined in terms of publications and not there at all in the case of equity deals. In Tables 6 and 7, we show the results for gene sequences and biotech patents. An increase in the normalized number of mentions of biotechnology in the Letters to Shareholders is positively and significantly associated with either type of patenting in subsequent years, even when controlling firm and year fixed effects (Models 6-1 and 7-1) and for previous patenting (Models 6-2 and 7-2). Introducing controls for firm size, financial well-being and competitive activity do not change the main direction of the effects (Models 6-3 and 7-3). We add additional controls for other firm characteristics such as scientific orientation, absorptive capacity, balance of power in the firm and market share in scientific fields. Unfortunately we can only construct these controls for 12 of our 15 original firms (American Home Products, Schering-Plough and Warner Lambert not included) and for 18 of the 23 original years (1976-1980 omitted) . Since previous work has suggested that taken together this set of controls is roughly equivalent to the firm fixed effects, we include them measured only in the first year of the sample (1981) and omit firm fixed effects. In the restricted data set, we replicate the results of the third model with firm fixed effects (Models 6-4 and 7-4) and then add the additional controls (Models 6-5 and 7-5). In each of these cases, the coefficient for the "stock" measure of recognition remains positive. These results are quite striking: even when controlling for a panoply of alternative hypotheses, this admittedly rather distant measure of managerial recognition retains its separate effect on strategic action. These findings are similar for both "stock" (accumulated number of mentions in the Letter to Shareholders) and "flow" (mentions in a particular year) measures of managerial recognition. Tables 6 and 7 about here - Table 8 shows the same 5 models for scientific publications. In this case, the main direction of the effect of recognition is the same as for gene sequences and biotech patents, but it 9 In the interest of space, we do not present in full the findings for "flow" measures and for three year lags (which broadly support these conclusions though the results are much noisier). For gene sequences, stock measures for 1 and 3 year lags and flow measures for one year lags are mainly positive and significant and flow 3 year lags are not significant. For biotech patents, stock measures for 1 and 3 year lags are positive and significant, flow measures for 1 and 3 year lags have mixed results. For biotech publications, all coefficients for all measures (stock and flow, 1 and 3 year lags) are positive but are only significant for selected stock and flow measures with 1 year lags. For equity deals, no coefficients are significant. The details are available from the authors.
is somewhat more attenuated (not significant in the restricted dataset with the smaller number of observations). Table 8 about here
For equity-based deals (Table 9) , there is no significant association between measures of recognition and action. This suggests three possibilities.
(1) Our current measure of deals is not as well defined or as comprehensive as that for patents and publications. (2) There is some other mechanism that connects recognition to response in the form of deals. (3) Deals are a completely separate process 10 from the sensemaking top management does about the firm and its environment and that the Letters to Shareholders reflect the issues that are important to the leadership with regard to internal efforts only (e.g., patenting and publication activities by the R&D group). Table 9 about here
Section V. Conclusion and directions for further research
The central goal of this paper was to explore the relationship between managerial recognition and strategic response in the case of significant discontinuity. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that would suggest that managerial sensemaking (recognition and interpretation) of the environment may be an additional explanatory factor in understanding firm fate and performance during periods of technological discontinuity.
We find strong qualitative, descriptive evidence for a relationship between managerial recognition of biotechnology and strategic action of publishing and patenting by firms and some suggestive support from the regressions. The relationship between equity alliances and managerial recognition of biotechnology is more complex. This suggests that for strategic actions involving deals the relationship between recognition and response is more nuanced than in the case of patents and publications. This may be because deals represent only one of a number of different ways in which the biotechnology knowledge capital of a firm can be developed.
Our results could clearly be extended in a number of directions. We would like to be able to include non English speaking firms in our analysis. More fundamentally, while the use of Letters to Shareholders as our primary data source for measures of recognition does offer some important advantages, they are not an ideal measure of managerial recognition or mental framing, and we would like to explore alternative, possibly qualitative, measures.
Nevertheless our results reinforce the notion that the recognition of key environmental uncertainties shapes certain types of enduring strategic action. This research thus highlights the role not only of managerial cognition in general but also of top management in particular and lends weight to the concept that top management plays a crucial role in both interpreting the external environment and shaping the internal response to this environment.
This work also makes a contribution to the management of technology literature by highlighting the importance of incorporating managerial recognition of discontinuities in our explanations of whether and when established firms respond in these periods of intense change and uncertainty. These explanations have traditionally been missing. Even when a more social constructionist view is taken, it is presupposed that the nature of a discontinuity is well understood as it takes place. Our empirical evidence provides at least some preliminary evidence consistent with the idea that this may be a misperception, and that a gradual evolution in managerial understanding of the nature of discontinuities may play an important role in shaping industry evolution. Table 1 List of pharmaceutical firms covered in the analysis
Firm
Years in data set Abbott Laboratories 1973 -1998 American Home Products 1973 -1998 Beecham 1973 Bristol-Myers (Squibb) 1973 -1998 Glaxo (Wellcome) 1973 -1998 Eli Lilly 1973 -1998 Merck 1973 -1998 Pfizer 1973 -1998 Schering-Plough 1973 -1998 Searle 1973 -1984 SmithKline (Beecham) 1973 -1998 Squibb 1973 Upjohn (Pharmacia & Upjohn) 1973 -1998 Warner Lambert 1973 -1998 Wellcome 1973 Table 3 Means and coefficients of variation over time for alternative measures of strategic action 
